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FROM FEDERALISM TO INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE:
THE CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN JURISDICTION
Robert B. Ahdieh*

In a mosaic of recent works, legal scholars have sought to grapple with new
realities and conceptions of jurisdiction. In this literature, jurisdiction entails
more than territorial and formalistic inquiries into applicable law and the
authority of a given court in a particular dispute. These authors have instead
engaged it as a "locus for debates about community definition, sovereignty,
and legitimacy."'
The impressive collection of work in this volume-the results of a
symposium on The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered

World-both advance and begin to draw together the varied strands of this
discourse. Exploring the changing nature of jurisdiction at both the
transnational and domestic level, the ensuing articles describe regimes of3
2
"translocal institutional transnationalism," "dialectical transnationalism,,
4 "polyphonic federalism, ' 5 "interaction's
"horizontal federalism,"
promise, ' 6
"network federalism," 7 "neo-medievalism," 8 and "intersystemic govemance." 9
* Visiting Professor & Microsoft/LAPA Fellow, Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton
University; Professor of Law & Director, Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance, Emory
University School of Law. Many thanks to Bill Buzbee, Judith Resnik, Robert Schapiro, and Mark Tushnet
for their helpful counsel, and to the student editors of the Emory Law Journal for their hard work in organizing
this symposium and their patience and assistance in the editorial process.
1 See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 319 (2002).
2 See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign
Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 34 (2007).
3 See id. at 54. To related effect, Judith Resnik also invokes "translocal institutionalism," see id. at 44,
and "democratic iteration," see id. at 82.
4 See id. at 44.
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But the basic patterns they explore actually resonate far more broadly. An

overlong-if still incomplete-list of works is instructive, in suggesting the
breadth of the relevant literature. At a minimum, it might include Paul
Berman's studies of "cosmopolitan pluralism";' 0 Benedict Kingsbury's and
Richard Stewart's explorations of global administrative law;" George
Bermann's analysis of transatlantic regulatory cooperation; 12 the study of
transnational networks by Anne-Marie Slaughter and others;' 3 studies of the

European Union, including especially work on the judiciary, on "comitology,"
and on framework statutes, the open method of coordination, and related
paradigms of "soft law"; 14 related to the latter, explorations by Chuck Sabel

5 See Robert A. Schapiro, Federalismas Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post- Westphalian
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 118 (2007).
6 See William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and
Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007).
7 See Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in Network Governments, 57
EMORY L.J. 167, 169 (2007).
8 See David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeabilityin TransnationalGovernance, 57 EMORY L.J. 201,
213(2007).
9 See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 121; cf Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation of 14a-8:
Intersystemic Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 165 (2007).
10 See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007); Berman, supra
note 1, at 490.
1 See, e.g., Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the InternationalLegal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2006); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15; cf. Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance:Law
and Constitutionalism in the WTO, in RULING THE WORLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds.) (forthcoming 2008).
12 See, e.g., TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS
(George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter A. Lindseth eds., 2000).
13 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); David Zaring, National
Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015 (2004);
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future of
InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
14 See, e.g., LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE E.U. AND THE U.S. (Grinne de Burca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006); KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (2001); Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S.
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695, 748-50 (2005); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek,
Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordination, II
EUR. L.J. 343 (2005); Francesca E. Bignami, The DemocraticDeficit in European Community Rulemaking: A
Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J- 451 (1999); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter
Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L ORG. 41 (1993); J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991); Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional
Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the United States and Europe, in RULING THE WORLD, supra note 11.
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and others of democratic experimentalism; 15 the varied new governance
literature;' 6 studies of cross-jurisdictional "engagement";

17

Greg Shaffer's

research on "transnational transformations of the state";' 8 work on the
interaction of international and national tribunals;' 9 strands of the latter
2°
literature focused on judicial citation of international and foreign authority
and on broader questions of legitimacy; 21 the discourse of global
constitutionalism; 22 Harold Koh's studies of transnational legal process; 23 Hari

Osofsky's analysis of multiscalar governance; 24 and a growing literature on
increasingly complex dynamics of federalism within the United States, in
constitutional law, corporate law, environmental law, and other areas. 25 In my
15 See, e.g., Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
16 See, e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management & A "Post-Sovereign" Transboundary
Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 113 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulationand the
Rise of Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Mattias Kumm & Victor Ferreres Comella, The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty
and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 473, 476 (2005); Vicki
Jackson, Constitutional Cosmology: Convergence, Resistance and Engagement in Transnational
Constitutionalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18 See, e.g., GREGORY C. SHAFFER & MARK A. POLLACK, COMPETING LEGAL ORDERS: LAW, POLITICS
AND THE STRUGGLE TO GOVERN GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (forthcoming 2008).
19 See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Redesigning the ECHR: Embeddedness as a Deep StructuralPrinciple
of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2008); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating
Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International
Law, 93 GEo. L. 487 (2005); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: InternationalReview of
National Courts,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004).
20 See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006); Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005).
21 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS &
INT'L AFF. 477 (2006); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: TransnationalLaw
and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1989 (2004); Robert 0. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew
Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
22 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, ConstitutionalConceits: The WTO's "Constitution" and the Disciplineof
InternationalLaw, in RULING THE WORLD, supra note 11.
23 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
24 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for
TransnationalRegulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005).
25 See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal
Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, DialecticalRegulation, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 863 (2006); Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessingthe Benefits of Dynamic Federalismin Environmental Law,
56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism,14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
108 (2005); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005);
Renee M. Jones, Rethinking CorporateFederalismin the Era of CorporateReform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004);
Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative
CorporateGovernance: Listing Standards,State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961
(2003); Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritorialityand Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism,150 U. PA. L.
REV. 855 (2002); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of
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own work, by way of further example, I have found occasion to explore the
dynamics of jurisdictional overlap and regulatory engagement in international
trade and finance, 26 in domestic corporate law,27 and in the interaction of U.S.

securities regulators with both subnational and supranational actors engaged in
correlated regulatory pursuits, which analysis I reprise and further develop in

my contribution to this symposium volume.28
Although these various works are directed to distinct subjects of study and

only occasionally engage one another, taken together, they bespeak something
broader at work. Our collective conceptions of jurisdiction would seem to be

in significant flux, with increasing attention to complex patterns of overlap and
engagement, not only among courts, but also among social, political, and
30
29
economic actors more generally. This is not an entirely new phenomenon;
yet the flurry of recent academic attention to patterns of cross-jurisdictional
regulatory engagement suggests a certain Renaissance, at least in our analysis
of them, and perhaps in their scale and scope as well.
For all the attention, however, I believe we have made insufficient effort to

draw the strands of this discourse together in meaningfully trans-substantive
ways; too few of the authors cited above read one another.

The works

collected in this volume and the symposium it chronicles-as well as a
predecessor symposium and volume of the Emory Law Journala'-represent

the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692 (2001). The literature of cooperative federalism might also be
highlighted in this category. See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism,in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Daphne A. Kenyon
& John Kincaid eds., 1991).
26 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation:A Dramatic Sketch, In Three
Parts,6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231 (2005); Ahdieh, supra note 19.
27 See Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization"to "Mixed Governance" in CorporateLaw: A Defense
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005).
28 See Ahdieh, supra note 9; Ahdieh, supra note 25; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federal Rules to
hitersystemic Governance in Securities Regulation, 57 EMORY L.J. 233 (2007).
29 Paul Berman has perhaps been the most consistent herald of both the emergence of a new conception
of jurisdiction and-in his emphasis on pluralism--on the complex of actors relevant to that conception. See
Berman, supra note 1. Robert Schapiro's longstanding emphasis on the need to go beyond the courts in the
construction and maintenance of federalism norms might also be noted. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 121;
Schapiro, supra note 25, at 294-96; see also Mark Tushnet, Judicial Enforcement of Federalist-Based
ConstitutionalLimitations:Some Skeptical Comparative Observations,57 EMORY L.J. 135, 141-44 (2007).
30 See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
31 See generally 56 EMORY L.J. 1-188 (2006) (works by Kirsten Engel, Steven Greene, Michael Heise,
Chip Lupu & Robert Tuttle, and Robert Schapiro, exploring symposium theme of "Interactive Federalism" in
areas including religious liberty, education, and environmental protection).
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one effort to encourage such a dialogue.3 2 This introductory piece takes a
further step, identifying common threads to be found in the facially diverse
articles and essays compiled in this volume. These threads, in turn, might also
be traced through the broader universe of works cited above. Although
necessarily preliminary, then, the enumeration of common characteristics I
offer may suggest elements of a research agenda for those engaged with the
broad dynamic
of jurisdiction I will characterize as "intersystemic
33
governance."
Drawing on the contributions to this symposium, this introduction
identifies and explores four facets of modern jurisdiction that run through them
and, perhaps, through the relevant literature more generally. Successively, I
highlight suggestions in the articles, both explicit and implicit, of complexity
and overlap, of a dynamic of coordination, of patterns of dependence among
regulatory institutions, and of a growing role for persuasion, rather than
hierarchical mechanisms of control, in regulatory design. These characteristics
are intertwined and overlap in significant ways.34 In attempting to systematize
the exploration of cross-jurisdictional engagement, however,
"some splitting"
35
may be in order, "as antidote to overzealous lumping."
In my brief essay at the close of this volume, I bring these strands of
analysis to bear in one of the areas in which I have explored patterns of
intersystemic governance-U.S. securities law.
Highlighting relevant
examples, I paint a picture of how the common threads identified in this
introduction might play out in the actual operation of legal regimes. In the
final analysis, our understanding of intersystemic governance will turn on such
microanalytic explorations of institutions across diverse fields.36 Much of the
above cited work, in fact, can be understood as just such microanalysis.
It is important to be clear about what these introductory remarks do and do
not attempt. A comprehensive account of the nature of modern jurisdiction,
32 Central to planning and organizing each of these symposia has been Emory University's Center on
Federalism and Intersystemic Governance, a program aimed at advancing just such dialogue on the nature and
implications of increasing jurisdictional overlap and cross-jurisdictional regulatory engagement.
33 Cf Ahdieh, supra note 9.
34 Perhaps most importantly, all might be understood as aspects of the initial dimension of complexity.
Overlap, coordination, dependence, and persuasion might thus be seen as patterns to be discovered if we go

beyond the initial sense of chaos and complexity in cases of intersystemic governance.
35 Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004).
36 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996).
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most importantly, lies beyond its scope. At best, it may help to facilitate
development of such an account, by identifying key elements for analysis. I do
not wish to suggest, however, that this is an exclusive enumeration of the
characteristics of the cross-jurisdictional engagements I refer to as
"intersystemic governance." Other features might be identified as well.
Robert Schapiro, for example, notes the functional and pragmatic orientation
of his construct of "polyphonic federalism"37-an orientation paralleled in the
other articles herein. I offer merely a starting point for discussion about the
common elements of the diverse and growing literature of intersystemic
governance.
Given this goal, the ensuing discussion does not attempt to systematically
weigh or dissect the enumerated elements. Nor does it engage the normative
implications of these features of intersystemic governance in terms of
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy. While both tasks will be
essential, I hope simply to highlight the ways in which each element can be
found in the articles compiled herein.
Ultimately, then, my goal is not to offer conclusions but to raise
possibilities: first, about the common features that might be found across the
independent literatures focused on interactive dynamics of modem jurisdiction;
second, about future research directed to the nature of jurisdiction-perhaps to
be pursued jointly and severally across our erstwhile scholarly bounds.
1.

COMPLEXITY AND OVERLAP IN INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE

By way of first impressions, the pieces in this volume evoke a quite
palpable sense of complexity. The analysis looks to complex social, political,
economic, and even psychological patterns to understand the legal and
regulatory dynamics at work. A complex world, of course, fosters the
emergence of more complex regimes of law and regulation.
Beyond this initial sense of complexity, however, one might identify a
particular focus on jurisdictional overlap. Such overlap motivates much of the
analysis herein. It is overlap that shifts the basic ground rules in regulatory
function and design and motivates the creation of more complex regimes of
law and regulation. It is nevertheless useful to begin our discussion with the
generalized sense of complexity that is one's first impression of the
37 See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 118.
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jurisdictional regimes explored in this volume-and too often one's last. The
dimensions of overlap, coordination, dependence, and persuasion might thus
be understood as regulatory patterns that can be teased38 out, once we move
beyond our initial, vague sense of regulatory complexity.
a. Regulatory Complexity: Of Actors and Structures
Judging by the ensuing works, complexity arises in intersystemic
governance at two levels. First, increasingly complex patterns of social,
political, and economic behavior-more actors, with more diverse and
multifarious interests, placing more moving parts into more potential positions,
with more far reaching consequences-are challenging existing legal norms
and institutions. Charles Koch suggests this dimension of complexity in his
analysis of administrative delegation as a response to social complexity: "The
more complex the society and the more complicated the demands on
government, the more elusive [a] balance [between legislative and
administrative authorities] becomes." 39 Bill Buzbee offers a similar sense of
underlying complexity in the predicates to the risk regulation regime he
40
studies.
More directly relevant to the functional nature of intersystemic governance
are the complexities of regulatory design that follow from the latter trends.
This begins with the wide range of actors that operate within regimes of
intersystemic governance-perhaps the primary source of the sense of
cacophony that may be the first reaction to such regimes. Collectively, the
articles in this volume tell a story of the emergence of new actors, both as
participants and third parties in the regulatory process; of old actors playing
new roles; of distinct actors taking precedence, and of new questions arising
from the foregoing. Judith Resnik's analysis of cross-jurisdictional networks
of local governments and their involvement in foreign affairs provides a
particularly resonant example. Localities' collective action only adds to this
complexity, as such networks "blur the line between nongovernmental
for they are voluntary,
organizations ("NGOs") and government organizations,
41
quasi-private associations of public actors.'
38 1 nonetheless analyze jurisdictional overlap as a facet of complexity, as it is the characteristic most
likely to be behind observers' generalized sense of complexity in regimes of intersystemic governance.
39 Koch, supra note 7, at 167; see also id. at 17 1.
40 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 153 ("[Mlany areas of regulation are characterized by volatility and
diversity, with concomitant changing states of knowledge.").
41 Resnik, supra note 2, at 34.
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Although he questions whether things have changed sufficiently to justify
talk of the death of the nation-state, David Bederman likewise highlights the

emergence of newly important transnational actors in his analysis of the
institutional nature of transnational governance. 42 Over the past century, he
suggests, "both the subjects of international law (the authoritative lawmaking
actors and parties affected by international rules) and objects of international

law (the legitimate topics of international legal regulation) have grown and
diversified.

43

This is paralleled domestically, with courts, regulators, and

political subdivisions playing an ever-increasing role in U.S. governance.44

Focusing on U.S. governance, Robert Schapiro-along with Mark Tushnet
in his exploration of the role of courts in enforcing federalism-looks to a
broader range of actors than standard U.S. constitutional analysis would
suggest. Courts are not alone in shaping U.S. federalism in Schapiro's more
complex scheme. As he notes, courts "are good at drawing lines, but
polyphonic federalism does not require lines to be drawn." 45 Rather, the

evaluation of comparative institutional advantage is a more nuanced exercise,
where "[e]xpertise or responsiveness or ease of redistribution may suggest the
superiority of state or federal regulators, but subject matter as such should not
be relevant in choosing the appropriate level of government to be the primary
regulator., 46

At a minimum, the cast of characters in modern law and

regulation has grown in size. Traditionally defined roles, however, would also
seem to be in flux.
With the interaction of new, newly empowered, and traditional regulatory
actors, complex new patterns of governance begin to emerge. Resnik
highlights a telling example in the peculiar efforts of federal executive
authorities to secure federal judicial protection against state and local
42 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 201.
43 Id. at 203. To related effect, Bederman highlights the emergence of new international organizations as
a particular category of new actor, as well as the growing role of transnational corporations in shaping public
policy. See id. at 205-06, 209.
44 See id.at 206-07. Some subset of the newly relevant actors in more complex regulatory regimes are
not direct parties to the regulatory process, but third parties subject to the heightened external effects of
intersystemic processes.
45 Schapiro, supra note 5, at 121 ("Courts have little institutional capacity to manage the complex issues
of overlap."); see also Tushnet, supra note 29, at 143-44.
46 Schapiro, supra note 5, at 120. With the influx of new actors and new roles for existing actors, as
outlined above, new questions of institutional priority are inevitable. Resnik, by way of example, asks whether
national or subnational actors should be privileged as the "principal agents of trade" in international and
foreign law and which particular actors within the chosen category should take precedence. See Resnik, supra
note 2, at 64.
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legislative initiatives in the realm of foreign affairs.47 Yet the full story may be
even more complex than this pattern of relations suggests: In Zschernig v.
Miller4 8 and in the National Foreign Trade Council's recent challenge to
Illinois' Sudan divestment law,49 the relevant courts actually went beyond what
the executive branch and corporate plaintiffs respectively demanded. 50 Amidst
a complex of new and emboldened actors, operating within complex new
institutional schemes, one is left to wonder who actually speaks for the foreign
relations concerns said to be at stake?
The other articles collected herein offer similar stories of complexity in the
operational patterns of governance: Bederman sees a growing shift from
melting pot to mosaic conceptions of social, political, and economic ordering,
and a resulting "neo-medievalism" in law and regulation. "Under the new lex
mercatoria, public and private international law merge into an
indistinguishable and seamless complex of commercial norms, practices, rules,
and laws." 5' Koch describes multiple patterns and directions of regulatory
influence in federal regimes, particularly among the complex of actors within
the European Union's "network" federalism. 52 Even in the divided federalism
of the United States, Koch finds a complex dynamic of delegation; 53 the
involvement of E.U. member states at every level of regulatory design and
implementation makes this even more so in Europe. 54 Finally, Buzbee sees
similar complexity in the regulation of risk, where "clashing interests and a
somewhat messy set of institutions" create an environment "where no one
controls the agenda and final choice. 55
Complexity is also evident in the ensuing articles' discussions of what
follows from the operation of intersystemic regulatory structures. Again,

47
4'
49
50
51

See id. at 71.
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 2007 WL 627630 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007).
See Resnik, supra note 2, at 75-76, 79-80.
Bederman, supra note 8, at 220. Bederman highlights a distinct pattern of complexity as well, arising

from the interplay of law and policy with science and technology. See id. at 230.
52 See Koch, supra note 7, at 167-68, 169.
" See id. at 179-80.
54 See id. at 168, 176; see also id. at 167 ("'These coordinated governments raise increasingly complex
implementation and devolution issues.").
55 Buzbee, supra note 6, at 164. Ernie Young might be read to echo this dimension of institutional
complexity, in suggesting a broader scope of the "constitutional" order in the United States, see Ernest A.
Young, Toward a Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93, 100 (2007), and in
his suggestion that the regime he proposes operate on a case-specific basis, to capture relevant variation and
nuance, see id. at 112.
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Resnik is instructive. At a functional level, she notes the operation of her
inter-governmental networks as both "importers and exporters" of law, 56 rather
than only the former-scholars' traditional focus.57 Further, she disputes the
common claim "that a turn to 'foreign' law intrinsically poses problems for
majoritarianism and for federalism. '' 58 Instead, federalism offers a legitimate
point of entry for international and foreign law and a means to its
or
domestication. 59 Where cities and other localities embrace international
60
foreign norms, the use of such law is quite democratic in character.
While thereby dismissing simplistic condemnations of the use of
transnational norms, Resnik emphasizes that her inter-governmental networks
are not a normative panacea. There is no necessary correlation between intergovernmental coordination and normatively attractive policy choices. The
historical record of such networks is rife with pursuits we might find
distasteful.61
Finally, perhaps related to the ambiguous normative implications of
intersystemic governance, several authors suggest some resistance to such
patterns. Resnik cites provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
which bar judges from using international or foreign sources to interpret the
Geneva Conventions. 62 Robert Schapiro and Mark Tushnet find similar
resistance in63 the traditionally exclusive role of certain courts in construing U.S.
federalism.
In the constructs of jurisdiction offered in the ensuing works, then, we find
complex dynamics of law and regulation: new and changed actors, altered
patterns of governance, and normative ambiguity, all arising from underlying
56
57
58
59

See Resnik, supra note 2, at 34.
But see Waters, supra note 19.
Resnik, supra note 2, at 35.

See id. at 34.
60 See id. at 63.
61 See id. at 89-91.

David Bederman also suggests the complex utility calculation for intersystemic

governance, in a different respect: Complex transnational regimes may offer far less predictability and stability
than the traditional nation-state system. See Bederman, supra note 8, at 216. Mark Tushnet's focus on the
lack of a normative theory of federalism might be understood to suggest a related dimension of complexity in
intersystemic governance. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 137-38.
62 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 66.
63 See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 121; Tushnet, supra note 29, at 143-44. Vicki Jackson has spoken of
the over-empowerment of lawyers and judges as a potential cost of heightened complexity in legal ordering
and suggested the need to identify "default rules" of a sort, to govern regulatory interactions of the type
explored herein. See Vicki Jackson, Closing Remarks: Workshop on Ruling the World: Constitutionalism,
International Law and Global Governance (Dec. 8, 2007).
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complexity in the social, political, and economic order. An altered cast of
characters comes together in new ways, with new priorities, raising new
questions. Institutional design follows suit, sometimes for better, sometimes
for worse. In particular, patterns of jurisdictional overlap---perhaps the most
direct by-product of a more complex cast of characters---emerge as the order
of the day. Beyond overlap, I will suggest in subsequent sections, patterns of
coordination, dependence, and persuasion might also be discovered in the
seeming complexity and chaos of intersystemic governance.
b. JurisdictionalOverlap in Intersystemic Governance
Patterns of jurisdictional overlap among independent regulators are not a
new phenomenon. As Robert Schapiro points out, echoing other contributors,
"In the West... this legal polyphony was the norm until the modem period.
Ecclesiastical law, municipal law, and trade law all overlapped and intersected.
A variety of bodies exercised political authority and the accompanying
lawmaking power. ' 64 Yet patterns of overlap are at least enjoying a
Renaissance of interest of late, if not actually expanding in incidence and
depth, through globalization of the economy and attendant changes.
Such overlap has its genesis in the blurring of jurisdictional lines. In
multiple respects, the law's traditional project of line-drawing is no longer
what it used to be. This pattern is evident at a substantive level and-following directly from the increased number of actors described above-in
the nature and interactions of those actors. 65 Twin sides of the same coin, I
consider these in turn. After suggesting an increased overlap in the underlying
issues subject to regulation, I highlight the resulting tendency of law and
regulation to reach beyond jurisdictional lines. Thereafter, I note tendencies
toward overlap in the nature and interactions of both the public actors who
generate law and the private actors subject to it.
i.

The Substantive Levels of Overlap

Our sense of jurisdictional overlap might begin with the growing number of
social, political, and economic phenomena of a cross-jurisdictional character.
64 Schapiro, supra note 5,at 122 (internal citations omitted); see also Bederman, supra note 8,at 213-14.
65 Again, it bears emphasizing that the complexity I describe above is very much a product of the overlap
I describe here-and of the need for coordination, the reality of dependence, and the role of persuasion, if to a
somewhat lesser extent. Thus do I cast jurisdictional overlap as a particular facet of the complexity generally
observed in regimes of intersysteic governance.
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The ready flow of capital across borders-whether national or subnational-is
perhaps the most familiar example. 66 More generally, Robert Schapiro
highlights the growing lack of substance in "the dichotomy of 'truly local' and
'truly national, '' 67 while Judith Resnik questions our ability to cabin the
universe of foreign versus domestic affairs.

68

From a slightly different angle,

David Bederman arrives at the same conclusion, pointing to a "century-long
progression of developments," by which "the legitimate
topics of international
69
legal regulation ... have grown and diversified.,

Given such pressure on the alignment of jurisdictional boundaries with the
issues subject to regulation, a further substantive dimension of overlap emerges
in the reach of law and regulation beyond jurisdictional lines.7 ° In its simplest
form, this is evident in extraterritorial applications of law. Highlighting such
applications 71 as part and parcel of a broader "interpenetration" of legal
regimes, 72 Bederman foresees a pattern in which "complex webs of domestic
law [are] incorporated and applied into international practice, not only in the
international economic field (such as trade or sanctions), but also for global
health and environmental issues.

73

As in Ernie Young's discussion of the shaping of U.S. commercial law by
both federal and state courts7-a pattern he analogizes to the regime of

concurrent jurisdiction between U.S. and supranational courts that he
proposes-Bederman sees these patterns of interpenetration as giving rise to a

See Bederman, supra note 8, at 217.
See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 120, 124.
See Resnik, supra note 2, at 35.
Bederman, supra note 8, at 203-04.
As in the discussion of complexity above, such overlap in the reach of legal rules responds to a reality
of overlap extrinsic to law. In Schapiro's account, patterns of intersystemic governance arise "in
circumstances in which political boundaries do not align with the jurisdictional reach of laws." Schapiro,
supra note 5, at 118. Resnik similarly highlights the overlapping scope of foreign and domestic affairs, and a
resulting tendency toward overlap in local, national, and international law. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 35. In
the face of these successive trends, Resnik counsels U.S. judges not to reject concurrency in local and national
jurisdiction absent clear evidence of its harm. See id. at 41-42.
71 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 221-23. Bederman cites the actual effects doctrine in antitrust law,
and the regulation of citizens' conduct abroad, by way of example. See id. at 222-23.
72 See id. at 219.
73 Id. at 224. Like Charles Koch, Bederman invokes patterns of overlap within the European Union-as
in the preliminary reference procedure by way of example. See id. at 228.
74 See Young, supra note 55, at 108-09. More generally, Young's suggestion of a shift in international
law to be more in the nature of federal courts law, is implicitly grounded in a story of overlap and the need to
mediate conflicts across jurisdictional lines. His proposed statutory regime, in turn, directly embraces
jurisdictional overlap with its provision for concurrency of jurisdiction and shared law. See id. at 103-04.
66
67
68
69
70
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new lex mercatoria and a resulting new layer of overlapping governance. 75
Bederman describes this as a neo-medievalism of sorts, embodying the "notion
that there can be, in fact, multiple authorities exercised over the same
individuals, communities, transactions, relationships, events, or bodies of
76
law."
Finally, Robert Schapiro's scheme of polyphonic federalism likewise turns
on the reach of the law beyond jurisdictional lines. "Polyphonic federalism
emphasizes that, as a descriptive matter, states and federal government in fact
exercise extensive concurrent authority. '77 Having long attended to such
patterns in domestic settings, Schapiro here highlights similar patterns of
overlap and polyphony in transnational settings:
Laws promulgated by one polity have effect in other polities. Many
factors account for the increasingly porous nature of legal
boundaries. Transactions often have transnational effects, subjecting
them to multiple schemes of regulation; and international agreements
have greater domestic impact, both because of their increasing
number and because of their increasing likelihood of applying to
conduct within a state, rather than simply to the conduct of a state.
75 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 209-10.
76 Id. at 214. Bederman's elaboration of this pattern is worth quoting at length:
As in the Middle Ages, before the advent of the modem, Westphalian nation-state in Europe, an
individual or community might have a multitude of sovereign or corporate loyalties, that run in
different directions. A local war-lord might have held feudal obligations to a superior noble and to
the Church, while he, himself, may have been owed obligations by nearby vassals and townships.
Merchant guilds and university colleges may have reported to higher secular or religious authority,
even as they exercised substantial power of their own ....
Neo-medievalism is the notion that
there can be, in fact, multiple authorities exercised over the same individuals, communities,
transactions, relationships, events, or bodies of law. As in the Middle Ages, multiple authorities
create multiple loyalties, thus destroying a monolithic system of governance (as in the Westphalian
nation-state model) in which all authority in a domestic polity derives from the sovereign (whether
a monarch or a republican government of representative institutions) and is exercised against all
subjects in a vertical fashion. Contemporary global politics has been likened to medieval models
insofar as we have, at present, a variety of species of entities that can exercise authority over
matters of international concern: States, treaty-based public international organizations (such as the
United Nations and its specialized agencies), subnational entities (autonomous municipalities or
provinces), regional bodies (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European
Union, or European Court of Human Rights), supranational organs (such as the World Trade
Organization), [transnational corporations], nongovernmental organizations and networks, and
other non-State players. Together, these entities, polities, and actors create a mosaic of governance
and international lawmaking, application, and enforcement.
Id. at 213-14.
77 Schapiro, supra note 5, at 121.
78 Id. at 123.
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ii. The Overlapping Nature of Actors

Overlap in the substantive reach of law is intertwined with overlap in the
nature of relevant actors. This begins with overlap among the public actors
who generate overlapping legal norms. It is also evident in overlapping
features of private entities subject to legal regulation.
Variously highlighted by all the articles herein, "multiple, overlapping
layers of authority" 79 are described in particular detail by Judith Resnik, Bill
Buzbee, and Charles Koch. Resnik seeks to assert a place for localities
alongside national institutions in the incorporation of international and foreign
norms into U.S. law. By way of example, she highlights the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). CEDAW's substantive demands, she suggests, look
beyond the Senate as a locus of action, 80 extending to local governments as
well. Relevant local initiatives thus go beyond simply encouraging Senate
ratification of CEDAW; instead, they seek to "turn[] 'transnational' law into
'local' law." 81 Such a local role engages an entirely new set of public actors in
the shaping of foreign82 affairs. In doing so, it evinces one dimension of overlap
among public actors.
Bill Buzbee finds similar overlap among public actors in his analysis of
risk regulation, arguing that "a diversity of actors and institutions" is essential
to effective regulatory decisionmaking. 83 Buzbee sees such diversity as a
result of both legislative and regulatory choices designed to "harness[] the
strengths of state and federal institutional actors and forc[e] the two to
interact." 84 Contrary to conventional notions, overlap is not to be avoided or
corrected in Buzbee's analysis, but to be embraced.
With it, "numerous levels
85
of regulatory action are venues for innovation."

79
80
"
82

Id. at 131.
See Resnik, supra note 2, at 56.
See id. at 58.
Mark Tushnet's discussion of the political safeguards of federalism also evokes this multiple-

regulatory-actors facet of overlap, in suggesting the role of both legislative and judicial institutions in shaping
federal regimes. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 142; see also Schapiro, supra note 5, at 121.
83 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 154. The operation of the common law in areas of risk regulation adds a
particularly significant dimension of overlap. See id. at 157.
84 See id. at 146.
85 Id. at 162. Schapiro likewise highlights the utility of overlap, including in the broader scope of
standing to bring federal constitutional claims in state courts. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 128.
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Resnik's exploration of the role of local government networks in the
engagement of localities with foreign affairs highlights another dimension of
overlap among public actors. 86 Such networks "both mirror the jurisdictional
boundaries of the United States and cross them." 87 Beyond the increasing
number of public actors engaged in regulation of any given issue, this
highlights a growing subset of regulatory institutions that are crossjurisdictional by design. Where localities come together under the auspices of
the National League of Cities and the transnational umbrella of United Cities
and Local Governments, they respond to underlying social, political, and
economic overlap not by trying to beat it-a possibility I take up in a
moment-but by joining it. Now, the relevant regulatory institution is itself
cross-jurisdictional.
Charles Koch's study of administrative delegation in Europe echoes this
analysis of local government networks. Within the European Union's
"network" federalism, patterns of engagement and coordination among
legislative and administrative authorities produce a regulatory dynamic akin to
Resnik's local government networks. 88 In present-day Europe, regulatory
authority is exercised through complex networks, in which power "move[s]
both vertically and horizontally." 89 As increasing areas of European law are
characterized by formal schemes of co-administration, in which "competences
are shared between the E.U. and the member state[s]," the transnational quality
of public actors becomes even more evident. 90 A network dynamic of overlap
among relevant public actors is likewise evident in patterns of judicial
policymaking in Europe, including the much-discussed preliminary reference
procedure, through which91 courts similarly coordinate the development of
cross-jurisdictional norms.

As noted at the outset, cross-jurisdictional characteristics are also evident
among private entities subject to regulation. Most familiarly, this is the story
86 See generally Resnik, supra note 2. Bederman likewise highlights political subdivisions' engagement
of other subdivisions as bringing a new set of overlapping social and political orders into play. See Bederman,
supra note 8, at 206-07.
87 Resnik, supra note 2, at 34. To related effect, Resnik emphasizes that cross-jurisdictional interactions
are not either vertical or horizontal in nature, but instead fall along a spectrum between those extremes. See id
at 40; see also Ahdieh, supra note 25.

88 See Koch, supra note 7, at 167-68, 173.

89 See id. at 168 (quoting WALTER VAN GERVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A POLICY OF STATES AND
PEOPLES 159 (2005)).
90 See id. at 178.
9' See id. at 178, 184.
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of multinational corporations subject to overlapping regulation in the various
jurisdictions in which they operate. 92 David Bederman highlights a similar
dynamic among individuals, given widespread immigration and movement of
93
peoples, as well as regimes of dual nationality and the "law of return."
"[C]ore concepts of citizenship and national allegiances," he suggests, have
changed.94 Whether at the corporate or individual level, the changing nature of
private actors provides a further engine of increasing jurisdictional overlap.

Perhaps given its direct challenge to our prevailing, line-drawing
conceptions of jurisdiction, jurisdictional overlap in intersystemic governance
appears to be a particular target of resistance and critique. Judith Resnik
highlights judicial resistance to overlap in jurisdictional regimes. 95 In Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,96 the Court's insistence on shaping its own
97
preemptive federal common law rule can be understood in this spirit.
98
Zschernig v. Miller and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade CounciP9 are to
similar effect. 00 Resnik questions this line of judicial reasoning, finding "such
an expansionist view of 'the foreign' and of national power . . . unduly
intolerant of variation and unduly empowering of national prerogatives and of
the Executive in particular."'' 1 Yet it has remained the dominant conception to
date. Judicial resistance to overlap may even be growing, if the courts'
receptivity to expansive constitutional notions of "dormant foreign affairs"
02
powers and "field preemption" are any indication. 1
92 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 217.
93 See id. at 218.
94 Id.
95 Charles Koch's account of judicial resistance to jurisdictional overlap, as exemplified by New York v.
United States, 488 U.S. 1041 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1994), perhaps most closely
echoes Resnik's account. See Koch, supra note 7, at 181. Schapiro, too, finds resistance to overlap in the
persistence of dual federalism and in challenges to the legitimacy of federal courts' interpretation of state
law-what Schapiro terms "intersystemic adjudication." See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 117. In prior work, I
have cited New York v. United States as emblematic of our traditional resistance to jurisdictional overlap. See
Ahdieh, supra note 25, at 867-68.
96 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
97 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 85.
9' 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
99 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
1oo See Resnik, supra note 2, at 85. Such resistance might be expected to grow stronger, Resnik suggests,
as concerns with terrorism take center stage. See id.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 72, 74-75, 76-77. In the latter doctrines' very emergence, on the other hand, one might find

some implicit acknowledgement of the reality of overlap. Why would field preemption be needed but for a
reality of jurisdictional overlap?
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Bill Buzbee offers a similarly detailed story of resistance to overlap in what
he characterizes as "unitary federal choice ceiling preemption." This species
of preemption, as evident in examples such as the Department of Homeland
Security's recently proposed regulations supplanting state and local regulation
of chemical plant risks, 10 3 can be understood by reference to the traditional
regulatory scheme of regulatory floors. By contrast with unitary federal choice
ceiling preemption, traditional regulatory floors encourage cooperative
federalism strategies, "leav[ing] room for more protective state and local
The recent
regulation or incentives created through common law regimes."
and
of
overlap
embrace of ceiling preemption thus resists the embrace
05
complexity in the literature of intersystemic governance.'

Collectively, the articles herein suggest the emergence of an increasingly
complex dynamic of law and regulation that both reflects and seeks to manage
underlying social, political, and economic dynamics. The world is growing
more complex, and regulation is following suit. In particular-and perhaps
most relevant for present purposes-the ensuing articles paint a picture in
which jurisdictional line-drawing is increasingly futile. The emergence of an
array of new actors; heightened mobility; increasing external effects driven by
new and varied technologies, and a litany of related trends have collectively
undermined the meaning-and perhaps the singular utility-of boundaries.
Overlap is increasingly the reality in law and regulation.
Concrete manifestations of this phenomenon can be found in the realm of6
securities law, which I consider in my essay at the close of this volume.
There, the substantive dimension of overlap might be seen in the growing
demand for harmonized accounting standards across jurisdictional lines. In the
meantime, a kind of extraterritorial approach has been the norm in U.S.
disclosure rules. Overlap in the nature and function of relevant actors,
meanwhile, can be found in the overlapping regulatory authority of state and
federal officials over the shareholder proxy and in enforcement matters, among
other areas.

103 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 149-50.
'o4 See id. at 147-48.
105 See id. at 157 ("Handing all regulatory power to one actor is the antithesis of the diversity of actors
called for in experimentalist literature.").
106 See Ahdieh, supra note 28.
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REGIMES OF INTERSYSTEMIC COORDINATION

Perhaps in response to the above patterns of jurisdictional overlap,
mechanisms of coordination figure prominently in the analyses herein,
suggesting a second important facet of intersystemic governance. The need for

coordination is implicit, for example, in Mark Tushnet's emphasis on the
political "deals" that define federalism in the United States.10 7 Such bargains,
at heart, are coordination games. 108 Federalism, as such, represents a regime of
coordination. Ernie Young's suggestion that international law should be more
like federal courts law than constitutional law likewise highlights the need for
coordination-the essential function of federal courts law.1°9 Finally, David
Bederman notes potential coordination failures and their costs, including 0a
11

decline in the coordinative capacity of traditional international institutions,

under-regulation by national authorities,"' potential races to the bottom,
2 and
the alternative prospect of extraterritorial applications of national law. 1 3
By way of response to the latter possibilities, the authors describe various
efforts at coordination among both private and public entities. On the private
side, Bederman notes the extent to which transnational corporations play a
coordinative role across jurisdictions,1 14 and perhaps related efforts to
coordinate transnational standards and ease the movement of capital. 115 More
generally, he highlights the "re-emergence of private-ordering mechanisms
and
' 16
customs among international economic actors (a 'new' lex mercatoria)."'

107 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 139. As he elaborates: "Federal systems consist of deals struck in light
of the perceived circumstances of the nation when its federalism is created." Id.
108 See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033 (2006).
109 See generally Young, supra note 55.
11o See Bederman, supra note 8, at 207.

"I See id. at 229.

112 See id. at 229-30.
113 Seeid. at221.
114 See id. at 209.
15 Seeid. at217.
116 Id. at 201. A step further down this line, Bederman points to the role of private organizations in

developing regulatory rules. See id. at 210. More generally, in Bederman's account, private coordination
plays out in two ways-both through the coordinative efforts of a transnational civil society of nongovernmental organizations, and through "more inchoate network mechanisms." See id. at 211. Exemplifying
the latter-"groups of like-minded individuals and subject-matter experts that collaborate in guiding the course
of international affairs," id. at 212-Bederman cites the International Chamber of Commerce and the Comitd
Maritime International, see id. at 219.
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Judith Resnik highlights the presence of such networks on both sides of
various regulatory questions. 117 She begins with the private side, citing the
role of "networks of activists

. . .

across a spectrum of issues," among other

examples. 118

Her primary focus, however, is the emergence of crossjurisdictional coordination among public actors," 9 frequently in response to
efforts at private coordination. 120

Citing the National League of Cities and

other examples, 12 1 Resnik describes growing cross-jurisdictional coordination
' 22
among public actors and agencies as a dynamic of "horizontal federalism."'
Charles Koch's analysis likewise explores coordination among public
actors. He offers a complex dynamic of coordination, vertically between
legislative

and

administrative

administrative agencies.

23

authorities

and

horizontally

among

Such coordination grows even more complex, he

suggests, as multiple levels of government
are combined in "coordinated
24
governments" such as the European Union.1

Koch highlights various European framework measures and soft law
regimes as mechanisms of coordination.

Collectively, these constitute

Europe's "network" system of governance. 125 Even where E.U. entities take
the lead in an area of regulation, they must coordinate effectively with member
state regulators charged with regulatory implementation.' 26 Two structures of
coordinative governance in the European Union might be particularly
highlighted in this vein. First is the central role given to subject-matter
committees, which essentially serve as vehicles of coordination.' 27 One might
also cite the "open method of coordination" and more general reliance of
European law on member state best practices grounded in open-ended E.U.
117 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 34-35.
"' See id. at 40, 45. Among business groups, Resnik cites USA*Engage and the National Foreign Trade
Council, by way of example. See id. at 78-79.
119 See id. at 47.
120 See id. at 42.
121 See id. at 47-48.
122 See id. at 44. Resnik's emphasis on the lack of any consistent normative payoffs from such
coordination bears reiterating. Coordination may advance unattractive goals, as in the case of certain efforts to
sustain discriminatory policies and practices and in the advocacy of the Bricker Amendment, as well as
attractive ones, as evident in the examples Resnik highlights throughout her analysis. See id. at 89.
123 See Koch, supra note 7, at 167-68, 174.
124 See id. at 167. Resnik cites the National League of Cities' integration with United Cities and Local
Governments as exemplifying such layers of coordination. See Resnik, supra note 2,at 49.
125 See Koch, supra note 7, at 167.
126 See id. at 178. Thus, "the Council itself not only reflects the interests of the member states but joins
together those in the member states concerned about particular matters." Id at 175.
127 See id. at 187-88.
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the latter are complex mechanisms of

Finally, Bill Buzbee offers additional insight into the nature of public
coordination in regimes of intersystemic governance. 130
Among its
proponents, the unitary federal choice ceiling preemption he describes is
justified by the need for effective coordination.' 31 It might be critiqued, on the
other hand, as a means of avoiding a true dynamic of regulatory coordination
among relevant actors. Regulatory ceilings can thus be contrasted with
regulatory floors. The latter are to be preferred, as they integrate
federal, state,
32
and local interests in a scheme of "cooperative federalism."',
In the design and evaluation of modem jurisdictional regimes, a capacity
for coordination is an increasingly central feature. In the face of regulatory
complexity and jurisdictional overlap, mechanisms of coordination are all the
more essential. Coordination-driven regulatory structures, as such, may have
an important role to play among the constituent elements of the modem
administrative state-and perhaps even more so in its engagements across
national borders. 33 As I will suggest in my essay in this volume, this has been
precisely the experience of the SEC. From below, it has been forced to
coordinate more closely with state officials, given the independent regulatory

128 See id. at 189; see also Ahdieh, supranote 25, at 912 n.262.
129 A related approach to coordination might be seen in Ernie Young's analysis of how the relationship
between domestic and international courts should be structured, with a framework statute facilitating
coordination between them. See Young, supra note 55, at 95. As to coordination within this framework,
Young describes supranational tribunals as playing the "coordinating role." See id. at 107.
130 Robert Schapiro might also be read to offer an interesting counterpoint to the standard story of public
coordination in citing the presence of various diffuse mechanisms of coordination as obviating the need for
widespread use of federal preemption. See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 131-32.
131 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 149-50; see also John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17
States Can't Set Greenhouse Gas Rules for Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at Al.
132 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 147-48. Buzbee's attention to "learning by monitoring" schemes
highlights yet another coordination dynamic at work. In the latter, monitoring, information pooling, and
benchmarking motivate a practice of regulatory adjustment designed to achieve optimal ends. See id. at 154.
133 The centrality of coordination may also highlight a broader point about intersystemic governance. The
latter might be distinguished from the constitutional and administrative law literatures with which it otherwise
most clearly intersects, on account of its distinct orientation. It is not focused on the limitation of regulatory
power, thus, but on enabling the effective use of such power. It is best understood as seeking to understandand enhance-the mechanisms of modem governance. Vicki Jackson has spoken of this as a question of the
efficacy of governance. See Jackson, supra note 63; see also David Golove, A Brief Mediation on Law and
War, at 3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting failure to "appreciate how law is an essential
component in a larger system of political decision-making, a primary purpose of which is to enhance, not
impede, the effectiveness of executive action). "In the main, law and effectiveness are not at odds; rather, law
is a crucial precondition of executive effectiveness." Id.
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initiatives of Eliot Spitzer and others. From above, the SEC's engagement
with transnational efforts to harmonize accounting standards has dramatically
increased in recent years, producing a regime of both substantive and
procedural coordination.
3.

INDEPENDENT REGULATORS AND INTERDEPENDENT REGULATION

A somewhat less apparent, but no less critical, strand of analysis in the
ensuing works is a dynamic of intersystemic regulatory dependence. Less
explicitly than the aforementioned features of regulatory complexity,
jurisdictional overlap, and regulatory coordination-and even than the
dynamic of persuasion I take up next-the articles herein evoke a tendency of
(otherwise independent) regulatory agencies toward dependence on one
another.
Given the more ephemeral evidence of it in the works collected herein, I
confess that this feature of intersystemic governance fits less easily in my
proposed enumeration than the other elements I identify. It is also among the
most politically salient dimensions of intersystemic governance, however,
given the involuntary quality that it introduces to such regimes. As such, it
deserves our attention. If independent agencies operating across jurisdictional
lines are indeed dependent on one another, our basic conceptions of the
dynamics of regulation and its legitimacy must necessarily change.
In significant part, patterns of regulatory dependence among independent
regulatory institutions can be traced to the nature of the national and global
economy. Bederman sees the ready flow of capital as creating an
interdependence of financial markets, as well as a heightened dependence of
nation-states on those markets and on the transnational corporations operating
within them. 134 In her analysis of "translocal networks," meanwhile, Resnik
cites a number of policy areas characterized by economic
dependence,
35
including economic development and immigration policy.'
Unsurprisingly, legal and regulatory regimes track these lines of economic
interdependence. Bederman notes various applications of national law to
citizens abroad, including attempts to bar subsidiaries of U.S. firms from
facilitating construction of a Soviet gas pipeline into Western Europe and the

134 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 209, 217.
135 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 60.
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freezing of Iranian assets in foreign branches of U.S. banks.' 36 With these
examples, he suggests the dependence of national regulation on a capacity to
discipline conduct overseas. Federal authorities' resistance to state and local
laws regulating spending and business activities tied to Burma or Sudan
137
likewise arises from economic interdependence across jurisdictional lines a kind of "spillover effect" of local economic decisionmaking, as Resnik
emphasis on the externalities of state
characterizes it. 138 Robert Schapiro's
13
regulation is to similar effect.
Beyond patterns of regulatory dependence motivated by an underlying
reality of economic dependence, the ensuing works also highlight other sources
of such dependence. Bederman notes the degree to which overburdened and
non-specialized U.S. courts are dependent on arbitral courts charged to
interpret the lex mercatoria.14 Perhaps even more notable is his suggestion
that state actors may depend on regulatory institutions beyond their borders to
circumvent internal obstacles to achieving desired policy ends-including
potential domestic capture. 14 Resnik echoes as much, noting localities'
establishment of the predecessor to the National League of Cities as a response
142
to state-level restrictions on "special legislation" favoring local interests.
The same dynamic arises in her pattern of "democratic iteration," by which
federal legislators may depend on local action, either as a means to circumvent
federal resistance to their policy preferences or as a way to force federal action
in that direction. 143 A final example is Resnik's suggestion of the dependence
of federal executive authorities on the courts to secure protection against state
and local initiatives in the realm of foreign affairs. 144
Charles Koch's study of administrative delegation, meanwhile, suggests the
potential for more recurrent and structured forms of cross-jurisdictional
regulatory dependence. Implementation of European Union framework

136
137
138
139

See Bederman, supra note 8, at 222-23.
See Resnik, supra note 2, at 75.
See id. at 88.
See Schapiro, supra note 5, at 116. Framing the story of economic interdependence even more

broadly, Schapiro highlights interconnections in the economy, the potential influence of out-of-state political
speech, and the dispersal of stakeholders in the modem public corporation as motivating an unavoidable
dependence among states. See id. at 131-32.
140 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 220.
141 Seeid. at230-31.
142 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 47-48.
143 See id. at 80, 83.
'44 See id. at71-72.
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measures and soft law depends entirely on member state action,145 forcing the

E.U. to attend to member-state interests in the regulatory process.146 A similar
process plays out in the United States in various efforts at federal coercion or
inducement of state and local officials. 147

While largely implicit in the ensuing articles, a certain interdependence of

nominally independent regulatory entities may represent an important feature
of emerging jurisdictional paradigms-both domestically and across national
lines. Such dependence may be less visible, in fact, because of its very
significance. As new jurisdictional patterns spread, take hold, and deepen in
their impact, heightened regulatory dependence might be seen as inversely
correlated with the voluntariness of the resulting regulatory regime. As such, it

may represent our most significant step away from existing paradigms of
autonomously articulated and implemented law and regulation.

Where the

SEC is variously dependent, as outlined in my contribution to this symposium,
on state courts and legislatures in defining the scope of shareholder access to

the proxy; on state attorneys general and other enforcement officials in
regulating investment and brokerage services; and on transnational networks of
public and private standard-setters in defining disclosure standards, our

understanding of its operation-and perhaps its very nature-must necessarily
change.
4. THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE
A final characteristic running through the contributions to this volume, and

echoed in related explorations of the nature of modern jurisdiction, is the
central role of persuasion in relevant regulation. This feature of intersystemic
governance is particularly significant, in its deviation from familiar notions of
what "law" and "regulation" do. Within regimes of intersystemic governance,
145 See Koch, supra note 7, at 168.
146 See id. at 186-87.
147 See id. at 181. Ernie Young's embrace of concurrent jurisdiction between supranational tribunals and
U.S. courts might also be understood as a story of dependence. Given the United States' unavoidable
dependence on supranational tribunals, he essentially suggests, such concurrence at least allows the U.S. to
play a role in shaping their jurisprudence. See Young, supra note 55, at 103-04. The political safeguards of
federalism discussed by Mark Tushnet likewise involves a kind of dependence between federal and state
authorities, see Tushnet, supra note 29, at 142, as does his expectation that even weak incentives of any given
legislator to protect the states will cumulatively provide adequate protection, given legislators'
interdependence upon one another, see id. at 143. Finally, the unitary federal choice ceiling preemption
critiqued by Bill Buzbee is also fairly understood as a response to a certain dependence of federal regulation
on the constraint of state and local action. See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 149-50.
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the quality of argument and analysis takes a front seat in determining
regulatory effect. The task of regulation, in significant respects, becomes
persuasion rather than coercion. 148 Judith Resnik suggests this distinct
emphasis early in her analysis, noting the importance of "acts' 149
of pronouncing,
reiterating, implementing, and internalizing legal obligations."
This is not to dispute any of what has gone before. There is significant
jurisdictional overlap. Independent regulators increasingly need to coordinate
with one another. In relevant cases, in fact, they may be highly dependent on
one another. Both the operationalization and longevity of these trends,
however, may depend heavily on regulators' ability to persuade fellow
regulators to join them in advancing common projects. More directly, a
heightened role for persuasion in the regulatory toolkit of the modem
administrative state may follow from the foregoing features of intersystemic
governance.
In a coordination game dynamic, the operative strategic need is to align
expectations, rather than alter incentives. 150 Given as much, coercive
intervention is unnecessary. Effective persuasion-persuasion capable of
influencing its subject's expectations of the advocate's future behavior-is
enough. In the face of dependence, on the other hand, such persuasion is not
optional. It may be essential to accomplishing desired regulatory objectives.
With the flattening of power suggested by the above elements, finally, the role
of persuasion becomes even clearer. Absent a certain hierarchy, coercive
approaches are simply not viable. Persuasion may be the only option.
To explore the role of persuasion in a new paradigm of jurisdiction, we can
successively consider structural features of persuasion's role and what I will
describe as the internally and externally directed dimensions of persuasion in
regimes of intersystemic governance.
In important respects, the articles herein can be read to tell a story of the
flattening of power. They suggest, in various explicit and implicit ways, a
148 Cf.H. Patrick Glenn, PersuasiveAuthority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261 (1987). One might recall, in this vein,
Richard Neustadt's conception of presidential power as "the power to persuade." See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT,
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP (1960); see also JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL

PRESIDENCY (1987).
149 Resnik, supra note 2, at 33. Resnik's emphasis on "expressive" initiatives by localities is in a similar
spirit. See id. at 46.
150 See Ahdieh, supra note 108, at 1052-53. The contrast, of course, is the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which
the players' incentives favor defection. See id. at 1051 n.84.
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softening of the sharp edges of hierarchy in law and regulation. If not quite
democratic, the allocations of power described herein are at least more
dispersed. David Bederman highlights the greater political space for interest
groups' efforts at persuasion in neo-medieval regimes. 15' Charles Koch echoes
as much, finding that policy choices are "buffeted by winds from many
directions. ' 52 Amidst multiple nodes of power, operating within various
complex schemes, 53 "[p]olicyrnaking goes down, up, and sideways." 154 In
this flattened power structure, by way of example, the World Trade
Organization-powerful as it is-must nonetheless
persuade a wide array of
55
international stakeholders of its legitimacy. 1
A flattening of power, and resulting need for regulatory institutions to
engage in persuasion to advance their aims, follows quite naturally from the
generalized sense of complexity I highlighted at the outset. Purely as a matter
of complexity, regulatory power is distributed in far more varied, and less
predictable, patterns than it once was. But the articles herein go a step beyond
this initial sense of complexity, to suggest particular patterns of governance
that are emerging to replace prior norms.
In lieu of hierarchical regimes, most importantly, a number of the authors
describe structures that foster direct engagement, and even conflict, among
relevant regulatory actors. Such engagement and conflict, in turn, invite
advocacy and persuasion. The various networks described herein can be
understood in this light.
Consider Resnik's intergovernmental networks, which can be seen as
mechanisms of persuasion designed to advance the interests of localities, both
externally and amongst one another. 156 This essentially is Resnik's story of the
local role in advancing CEDAW, as well as climate change legislation, in the
United States.' 57 More broadly, it is her story of federalism generally:
For me, the federated system within the United States-with its
hundred-plus mentions of the word state in the Constitution and its
tripartite division of federal power-entails aspirations for
transparent, redundant debates about laws and policies. These
151 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 216.
152 See Koch, supra note 7, at 179.
... See id. at 167.
114 Id. at 179.
155 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 215-16.
156 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 45.
157 See id. at 56-57, 62.
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multiple sites for conflicts about social norms are the opportunities
provided by democratic federalism to permit problems to be argued
in more than one forum and more than once.
David Bederman's talk of the "re-emergence of private-ordering mechanisms
and customs among international economic actors" is to similar effect.' 59 The
latter bespeaks a certain kind of network, advanced through the persuasiveness
of its rules and institutions among its members and potential members rather
than through any capacity for coercion.
One can see this structured dynamic of engagement and conflict more
concretely in a pair of examples. First, consider Bill Buzbee's discussion of
60
learning by monitoring, a critical dimension of regulatory experimentalism. 1
Learning by monitoring is essentially an exercise in engagement and ensuing
persuasion, with its successive pooling of information, benchmarking, and
monitoring,161 to achieve shared regulatory understandings. Even more
163
62
broadly, it seeks to create incentives to criticize and otherwise participate,
164
ultimately producing a dynamic of engaged discourse and persuasion.
Judith Resnik's discussion of the reporting requirements of CEDAW,
which mandate that signatories report on their progress in advancing the
substantive terms of the treaty, offers a second example. Upon submission of
such reports, a public dialogue regarding each signatory's successes and
challenges ensues.' 65 Each nation is thereby forced "to interrogate its own
understandings of equality by comparing its rules and practices to those of
others and to talk with a diverse group of experts . . . about what equality

means in context."'' 66 The iterative, pedagogic nature of this process is worth
emphasizing: "[A]s different localities generate various provisions, one can
interrogate one's own norms through a comparative exercise."' 167 Ultimately,
the entire scheme can be seen as an attempt to trigger both collective and
158 id. at 41; see also id. ("[T]he reiterated conflicts are desirable because they enable us to watch and to
participate in struggles over the content of the law of the United States.").
159 See Bederman, supra note 8, at 201.
160 See Buzbee, supra note 6, at 154.
161 See id.
162 See id. at 157.
163 See id. at 159, 160-61.
'64 See id. at 163, 164.
165 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 53.
166 id. at 53-54; see also id. at 53 ("This form of norm elaboration provides a mechanism to integrate

transnational premises of equality into the very different contexts of nation-states.").
167 Id. at 86.

20071

FROM FEDERALISM TO INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE

individual engagement with relevant norms and thereby encourage the
evolution of such norms toward preferred ends.
As regulatory regimes move toward a flatter allocation of power, with
institutional mechanisms of engagement and even conflict, two vectors of
persuasion might be expected to play out-the first internal and the second
external. Internally, the dynamic of persuasion is one of discourse. At a
fundamental level, this is what the many networks described above are all
about. Both the public networks emphasized by Resnik and the private ones
described by Bederman are designed, among other things, to encourage a
vibrant and ongoing discourse among their members. Such discourse, of
course, involves a dynamic of persuasion rather than coercion.
Koch's analysis of "network" federalism offers further insight into the
internal dimension of persuasion in its exploration of the dynamic of
comitology in Europe. 168 E.U. committees, with members nominated by
member states, play a central role in European governance. Both the design of
Europe-level policies and their translation in member-state implementation
owe much to the committee structure. More functionally, the committees help
to overcome barriers including language, ethnicity, and the like. 16 9 At all
levels, the committees emerge as nodes of advocacy-downward, upward, and
sideways as well. The persuasion of various
European and member state
70
regulators is thus at the heart of their role. 1
The distinct importance of persuasion in the new paradigms of jurisdiction
explored herein, however, is clearest in externally directed efforts at
persuasion. Here, the strength of relevant ideas is dispositive of the regulatory
dynamic at work. This is readily apparent in the ensuing works' discussions of
the interaction of judges across jurisdictional lines. Robert Schapiro offers
some hint of this in his description of polyphony in federal regimes, 17 1 but
Charles Koch and Ernie Young give it particular emphasis.
In Koch's case, the centrality of externally directed efforts at persuasion is
evident in the judicial dialogue between European and member-state courts,

168 See Koch, supra note 7, at 188.
169 See id.
170 Koch's discussion of language might also be understood to evoke a dynamic of persuasion. See id. at
198.
171 Within Schapiro's regimes of polyphonic federalism, thus, the efficacy of cross-border assertions of
jurisdiction, legal analysis, and the like ultimately depend on their power in a marketplace of sorts.
Schapiro, supra note 5, at 131.

See
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particularly by way of the preliminary reference procedure. 172 Ultimately, this

engagement rests on a dynamic of judicial persuasion, in which courts advance
their agendas by enlisting the agreement and support of their fellow judges on
independent courts. Consider the European Court of Justice's gradual
persuasion of the German Constitutional Court to accept its jurisdiction to
regulate questions of individual rights, notwithstanding the German court's
early resistance to that prospect. 173 Over a series of cases, the European Court
of Justice convinced the German court of its174(arguably newfound) commitment
to human rights, thereby bringing it around.
Young's proposed scheme of concurrent jurisdiction and shared law
between national and international tribunals-with generalized deference to
the latter-is to similar effect. 175 Within this regime, the persuasiveness of
national courts' arguments and analyses is critical, as is the persuasiveness of
the supranational tribunal, ongoing deference to which cannot be taken for
granted. Young's ultimate intent, "to promote the discipline of written reasongiving and public criticism," affirms this dynamic of persuasion. 176
More direct efforts at external persuasion can also be found in the analyses
herein. David Bederman highlights the regulatory impacts of transnational
77 of nongovernmental
corporations (and their trade associations),
• • 1 178re
organizations (including by way of amicus briefs),
and of less structured
epistemic communities. 9 In each case, the efficacy of the relevant institutions
relies on persuasion, rather than anything in the nature of coercion. 180 Judith
Resnik's account of "democratic iteration," and particularly the ways in which
federal actors both stoke and invoke local policysl initiatives, is a further
example of externally directed efforts at persuasion.'
More broadly, one might understand Resnik's effort to shift scholarly
discussion of the domestic use of international and foreign legal authority to
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

See Koch, supra note 7, at 177-78, 194.
See Ahdieh, supra note 19, at 2155-60.
See id.
See Young, supra note 55, at 103-04.
Id.at 111.
See Bederman, supra note 8, at 209.
See id. at 211-12.
See id. at 213.
See id. at 201; see also id. at 210.
See Resnik, supra note 2, at 80-83. Tushnet's emphasis on the role of political mechanisms, rather

than exclusively the courts, in the construction of federalism might also be cited in this vein. See Tushnet,
supra note 29, at 141-44.
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move toward a more explicit dynamic of persuasion. By shifting the focus
away from judicial citation of international and foreign authority-a football
of scholarly debate and recrimination in recent years-and toward the choices
of democratically elected executive and legislative institutions functioning at
the local level,18 2 Resnik gets to the critical question: the true value and utility
Within this framework, the use of
of transnational law and norms.
international or foreign authority turns on the question of its substantive utility
than the perhaps overheated
and appeal-of its persuasiveness-rather
83
legitimacy.'
its
of
question
The foregoing suggests a need for greater attention to noncoercive lines of
regulatory action. As legal scholars, we remain overly prone to give
precedence to coercive patterns of regulatory intervention. This may be
especially true among international legal scholars, given a certain sensitivity to
inquiries about the truly legal character of international law. Yet changing
dynamics in the substantive areas explored by the articles herein, and in the
broader literature that I would bring under the umbrella of intersystemic
governance, may warrant greater attention to-and appreciation of-the role of
persuasion in law and regulation. In the regulation of the securities markets,
which I consider in my essay herein, this is readily apparent. In significant
respects, the modem project of the SEC is one of advocacy and persuasion
among both state institutions with the authority and capacity to impact
shareholder proxy access, investment counsel, and mutual fund trading and
among foreign and transnational institutions charged to define the requirements
of financial disclosure overseas.
CONCLUSION

The limitations of the foregoing should be self-evident. I do not claim to
offer a comprehensive exploration of the nature and features of intersystemic
governance. Nor do I consider the normative implications of that pattern, in
terms of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy. I do not even assert that
182 See Resnik, supra note 2, at 63.
183 Much of the dynamic of persuasion in the analyses herein might be traced to a heightened role for

norms in the operation of regimes of intersystemic governance. This is apparent in Resnik's analysis of the
potential impact of CEDAW's reporting procedures, as described above. See supra notes 165-67 and
accompanying text. To related effect, Resnik notes the invocation of asserted universal norms in localities'
encouragement of the ratification of CEDAW.

See Resnik, supra note 2, at 58; see also id. at 34, 45

(describing role of localities as "norm entrepreneurs"). If norms have a central role to play, then persuasionamong the central tools for shaping norms-becomes essential as well.
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my enumeration of its characteristics is complete. The basis of that
enumeration, as well as my evaluation of those characteristics, thus draws
almost exclusively on the works collected in this volume.
For the introductory purposes intended, however, the foregoing proceeds
hoped. First, it offers an angle of approach to the fascinating collection
work published herein. Second, and likewise by way of introduction,
identifies common strands found in those works, which might also be found
the broader literature engaged with the nature of modem jurisdiction.

as
of
it
in

In doing so, it introduces the possibility of thinking in more systematic and
trans-substantive ways about our serial discussions of the European Union,
courts' citation of international or foreign authority, U.S. federalism, global
administrative law, and the like. With this, it aspires to encourage a broader
dialogue across these literatures. If it succeeds in doing so, it will have well
served its purpose.

